and philosophy. They argue that its appeal lies in the anthropomorphizing of what is essentially a market theory: 'The bodily organism is used as a model for the psyche, and both psyche and organism are used as a model for the market. All three are rationalized by the idea of hierarchies and needs" (p. 39). They find the concept (which they refer to as "A Way of Saying Nothing") to be rooted in two principles, the idea of the solipsist self, and the idea of avoiding political bias. These assumptions often distort the statistical data collected by social scientists about human agents in economic and political affairs. Rather than promoting objectivity, these principles often protect a political bias. This point has been examined in some detail by Schram (1995) who shows how welfare policy research is embedded in state practice and structures; written from a top-down position and in a managerial discourse, relying on an assumed cost-benefit analysis. Like Nancy Fraser (1989) , he sees welfare policy discourse as a "politics of needs interpretation," which, similar to ethnographies that articulate alternative understanding of recipients and their needs, "provides a basis for contesting the way in which the existing bureaucratic discourse imputes identities and needs to persons seeking assistance" (Schram 1995: 43) .
Douglas and Ney argue that the individualistic model of the person, fostered in large part by economics, has profoundly affected how we think about our needs and well-being. The authors propose to correct this by revising the current model of the person; taking cultural variation into account while giving full play to political dissent. They see a multicultural context as allowing a far more even-handed view of issues such as poverty and well being and identify four varieties of cultural personhood; individualist, hierarchist, enclavist, and isolate, distinguished on the basis of structure and incorporation, which are potentially present in any community. Each has a distinctive definition of well being that it would like public policy to achieve. "Individualists" aim to free themselves from the fetters of social restriction. They thrive on loose organizational structure. Well-being for them means the freedom to pursue self-interested ends. "Hierarchists" seek to make a community that is an orderly system; their moral framework is one of differentiated obligations according to place in complex organizational structures. They have a broader, longer-term, stratified conception of well being. "Enclavists" strive to create a community that is free of control. Morally, they appeal to subjectivity and individual conscience. Enclavists perceive well being on a global scale: Everyone is equal, and well being is a world free from domination and inequality. "Isolates," by definition, are cut off from political maneuvering and influence. They do not have a coherent idea of well being and do not expect coherence from policy makers.
According to Douglas and Ney, by interpreting the intentions of stereotypical others according to the language of cultural conflict, each culture achieves logical closure on its premises and succeeds in reproducing its own system of control and accountability. Thus, policy arguments reflect the social context from which they emerge and the conflicting norms and aspirations provide the basis for policy conflict. Relying on Hajer's idea of a discourse coalition, "a group of actors who share a social construct" (Hajer 1993: 43) , the authors see such groups, which they refer to as "cultures in dialogue" (p. 126), as battling in the public sphere for legitimacy. They provide examples which illustrate how distinctive cultures produce policy arguments that articulate their culture's construction of well-being and go on to critique theories of policy conflict, for example, pluralist incrementalism (Lindbloom 1965 , Collingridge 1992 , and civic responsiveness (Putnam 1993) , from this vantage point. And, of course, given her earlier work (Douglas 1986) , they examine risk perception under the lens of cultural theory. In sum, the authors contend that their theory of cultural personhood provides a way to address the issue of political conflict by offering a concept of the human as a political animal.
In Missing Persons, Douglas and Ney have set forth a fundamental critique of the social sciences, drawing from an array of literature, including anthropology, economics, political science, and sociology. They present a compelling argument that Homo Economicus is a defective theory of the person, explore how the defects came about, and why they are so difficult to remedy. They offer an alternative view of personhood that takes cultural variation into account while giving full
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Vol. 6 1999play to political dissent. Social scientists, particularly those concerned about poverty and well being, will find this a challenging and valuable polemic.
